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Bosnia v. Serbia: Lessons from the Encounter
of the International Court of Justice with
the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia
RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE AND REBECCA J. HAMILTON*

Abstract
This article uses the recent judgment of the ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia to highlight the potential
problems that arise when international courts have to adjudicate on overlapping situations. It
describes the dispute between the ICJ and the ICTY on the appropriate legal standard for the
attribution of state responsibility, and finds that the ICJ's approach in this case suggests that
those keen to minimize the fragmentation of international law between adjudicative bodies
should not overlook the need for consistency within those bodies. With regard to fact finding,
this article raises serious concerns about the manner in which the ICJ relied on the ICTY's
work. The decision of the ICJ not to demand crucial documents from Serbia is discussed and
criticized. Based on its approach to fact finding in this case, doubts are raised as to whether the
ICJ will ever hold a state responsible for genocide outside the parameters of the prior criminal
convictions of individual perpetrators.

Key words
evidence; fact-finding; fragmentation of international law; genocide; International Court of
Justice; International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

I. INTRODUCTION
The recent judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)' was a historic moment
for the global community. The question before the ICJ was whether Serbia2 could
be held responsible for genocide on the basis of atrocities committed in Bosnia
and Herzegovina following the 1992 break-up of the former Yugoslavia. The case

*
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Richard Goldstone is Mulligan Visiting Professor of Law at Fordham Law School, former Chief
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (e-mail:
rgoldstone@iafrica.com). Rebecca J. Hamilton, J.D., M.P.P. (Harvard Law School; John E Kennedy School
of Government), is a former intern of the ICTY (e-mail: RebeccaHamilton@post.harvard.edu). This article
was submitted in August 2007.
CaseConcerning the Application ofthe Convention on the PreventionandPunishment ofthe CrimeofGenocide (Bosnia
andHerzegovina v. Serbia andMontenegro), Judgment of 27 February 2007 (hereinafter Bosnia v. Serbia).
When the case began in 1993 the respondent's name was the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). FRY
President Milosevid was overthrown on 5 October 2000, and on 4 February 2003 the FRY's name changed
to Serbia and Montenegro. However, on 21 May 2006 Montenegro declared its independence, and so by the
time of the final judgment the respondent's name was Serbia. In the following article the respondent will be
referred to as 'Serbia'.
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represented the first time that a court had adjudicated whether a sovereign state
could be held responsible for genocide in the almost sixty years since the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was unanimously
approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations.3
The ICJ's 17i-page judgment is likely to generate a plethora of journal articles as
legal scholars assess the long-term impact of the judgment on previously uncharted
territories of international jurisprudence. In this respect, one of the most interesting issues arising from the case involves the challenges presented when different
international courts have to adjudicate on overlapping factual situations.
The general issue of the fragmentation of international law has already been the
topic of much legal writing, 4 and the International Law Commission has conducted
a working-group study on the potential for the fragmentation of jurisprudence with
the proliferation of international adjudicative systems.5 In the arena of international
criminal law this discussion came to prominence following the creation of the
first ad hoc criminal tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, and is likely to remain a topical issue with the advent of
the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC).
Given that the ICTY has now produced over a decade's worth of jurisprudence
on the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia, the ICJ's Bosnia v. Serbia
judgment makes for a particularly good study of the issues that can arise when
an international court with one mandate has to adjudicate on a situation that an
international court with a different mandate has already adjudicated on. The ICJ is
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and its work involves disputes
between states. By contrast the ICTY was created by the United Nations in order to
establish individual criminal responsibility for the atrocities committed since 1991
in the former Yugoslavia. The consequences of these differences in mandate and
expertise come to the fore in Bosnia v. Serbia.
The overlap between the issues in Bosnia v. Serbia and the ICTY cases arises in
terms of both the legal analysis and the fact-finding process. With respect to the
former we look at the ICJ's legal test for the attribution of state responsibility,
established in Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and againstNicaragua(Nicaragua
v. United States ofAmerica),6 and restated in Bosnia v. Serbia,7 as compared with the

3.
4.

5.

6.
7.

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948,78 UNTS 277
(hereinafter Genocide Convention).
The commentary on the question of fragmentation falls into two broad streams: those who view fragmentation as a chaos to be avoided; see, e.g., G. Guillaume, 'The Future of International Judicial Institutions,'
(1995) 44 ICLQ 848, at 862 , and those who embrace it as a sign of the maturing of international law; see, e.g.,
M. Koskenniemi and P. Leino, 'Fragmentation of International Law? Post-modern Anxieties,' (2002) I5 LJIL
553, at 57 5-9. A middle ground has been pursued by ICJ President Rosalyn Higgins; see R. Higgins, 'A Babel
of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench,' (2006) 55 ICLQ 791 (suggesting that commentators may
have exaggerated the potential for fragmentation, as in her view the different international courts will seek
common approaches wherever possible).
'Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,' Yearbook of the InternationalLaw Commission
(2006), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft/2oarticles/I_9_2006.pdf.
Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and against Nicaragua(Nicaragua v. United States ofAmerica), Merits,
Judgment of 27 June r986, [r986] ICJ Rep. 392 (hereinafter Nicaragua),paras. ro9-Ino, 115.
Bosnia v. Serbia, supranote i, paras. 391, 399, 401 (affirming the legal tests established in Nicaragua).
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test proposed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutorv. Tadic8 We find that the
ICJ's approach in Bosnia v. Serbiawas a sensible one, and that the ICJ's concern not to
disrupt the consistency of jurisprudence within the ICTY, and within its own court,
should be taken into account by those who are interested in the project of generating
principled guidelines for consistency between international bodies.
With respect to the issue of fact finding, we first show how the ICJ drew inferences
not only from the findings of guilt made by the ICTY, but also - problematically
- from the absence of certain ICTY convictions, and even charges, in order to find
that genocide had not occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina in any region other
than in Srebrenica. 9 We then look at how the ICJ addressed the factual questions
relating to whether Serbia could be held responsible for the Srebrenica genocide.
We note that the failure of the ICJ to request unredacted versions of documents that
Bosnia and Herzegovina believed would show that the genocide at Srebrenica could
be attributed to the Serbian state, along with the ICJ's refusal to draw a negative
inference from Serbia's failure to produce those documents, may turn out to be the
this case's most troublesome legacy.'o

2. THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR THE ATTRIBUTION OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY
The past decade has produced an ongoing debate among legal scholars about the
extent of disjunct between the jurisprudence of the ICJ and ICTY on the question of
the appropriate legal standard for imputing the actions of an individual, or group
of individuals, to a state." So far as the issue of state responsibility falls within
the purview of international law, over which the ICJ has general jurisdiction, it is
presumed to be more competent in this area than the ICTY, which has jurisdiction
over issues of individual criminal responsibility. Indeed, in its decision in Nicaragua
the ICJ established a test for the attribution of individual actions to a state almost a
decade before the ICTY came into existence.' 2
2.1. The ICJ's Nicaragua standard for attributing state responsibility
In Nicaraguathe ICJ needed to determine whether the acts of a group of non-state
actors, the Contras, in Nicaragua, could be attributed to the United States. Under
Nicaraguathe Court determined that the actions of actors who are not organs of the
state under the internal laws of the state can still be considered de facto organs of
the state if their relationship is 'one of dependence on the one side and control on the

8.
9.
10.
r1.

12.

Prosecutorv. Tadic, Judgement, Case No. IT- 94 -i-A,App.Ch., 15 July 1999 (hereinafter TadicAppeal), para. 145.
Infra section 3.1.1-3.1.2.
Infra section 3.2.1.
See, e.g., M. Sassoli and G. Olson,'International Decision:Prosecutorv. Tadic', (2000) 94 AJIL 57r, at 575; M. A.
Drumbl, 'Looking Up, Down and Across: The ICTY's Place in the International Legal Order', (2003) 37 New
EnglandLaw Review 1037, at o5o-5 r. D. Jinks,'State Responsibility for Acts of Private Armed Groups', (2003)
4 ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw 83, at 89; M. Sassoli,'State Responsibility for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law', 2002 (June) 84 InternationalReview oftheRed Cross40, at 407-8.
Nicaragua, supra note 6, at paras. ro9-nro, 115.
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other'.' 3 When a relationship of such 'complete dependence' is found, all the acts of
those formally 'non-state' actors can be imputed to the state. However, even when
this standard of 'complete dependence' is not met, the conduct of individuals may
still be attributable to the state if the latter had effective control over the specific
operations in the course of which such conduct took place.' 4
The ICTY's use of Nicaragua to determine the nature of an armed conflict
In 1997 the ICTY Trial Chamber introduced the Nicaraguadecision into its jurisprudence in order to answer the question of whether or not the conflict in Bosnia
and Herzegovina was an internal or an international armed conflict.' 5 This question
was relevant to the work of the ICTY because under international humanitarian law
(IHL) individuals can only be charged with 'grave breaches' crimes of the Geneva
Conventions (as set out in Article 2 of the Statute of the ICTY) committed during
an international, but not internal, armed conflict,' 6 and only if their victims are
'protected persons' under Article IV of the Geneva Conventions. 7
When an armed conflict involves two sovereign states, the conflict is obviously
international. However, when the conflict involves a state and one or more nonstate actors, even though operating across international borders, as in the case of the
former Yugoslavia, it becomes necessary to impute the actions of the non-state actors
to another sovereign state in order to determine that the conflict is international.
Without such an attribution the conflict is viewed as internal and so the 'grave
breaches' regime of the Geneva Conventions does not apply.' 8
Prior to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, what was then the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) maintained a national Yugoslav People's Army (JNA).
During the break-up of the SFRY the political leadership in the Serb-controlled
region of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed its own entity called the Serb Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (subsequently Republika Srpska). On 12 May 1992 the
Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) was formed. Pursuant to a UN Security Council
resolution,' 9 the FRY formally withdrew JNA forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina on
19 May 1992. However, not only were troops of Bosnian Serb origin from throughout
the JNA transferred into the VRS, but the FRY maintained control over the VRS. 20 The
extent of that control became a key issue for the ICTY cases dealing with atrocities
2.2.

13.
14.

15.

r6.
17.
r8.

19.
20.

Ibid., para. 1o9.
Ibid., para. rr5.
Although as the former ICTY president Theodore Meron points out, the Nicaraguacase was first 'discovered'
by the ICTY in a review of the Indictment in Prosecutorv. Raji, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule
6r, Case No. IT-9 5 -12-R61, T. Ch., 13 September r996. See T. Meron, 'Classification of Armed Conflict in the
Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's Fallout,'(1998) 92 AJIL 236, at 240.
Prosecutorv. Tadic, Defence Motion for Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-I-AR7 2, A. Ch., 2 October r995,
para. 84.
TadicAppeal, supranote 8, at paras. 80-8 2.
For a compelling argument in favour of the extension of the 'grave breaches' regime to non-international
armed conflicts, see T. Meron, 'International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities,' (r995) 89 AJIL 554. See
also Prosecutorv. Tadi, Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, Case IT-94-I-AR72, 5-6, 2 October r995, para 5.
SC Res. 752, UN Doc. S/RES/7 5 2 (1992), para. 4.
Prosecutorv. Tadi, OpinionandJudgement, CaseNo. IT- 94 -i-T,T.Ch. 11,7 May1997, paras. 113-I 8 (hereinafter
Tadictrial judgment).
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committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the formal withdrawal date.2 ' If the
control that the FRY had over the VRS in Bosnia and Herzegovina was sufficient to
impute the acts of the VRS to the FRY, then the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
could be considered 'international' for the purposes of IHL and, accordingly, those
brought before the Tribunal could be charged with crimes against protected persons
under the 'grave breaches' regime of the Geneva Conventions.2 2
2.3. The ICTY trial chamber's use of Nicaragua in Tadid
Dugko Tadi6 was a caf6 owner and karate expert who had access to the detention
camps in Prijedor, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was brought before the ICTY on
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity that allegedly occurred in the
camps in 1992. In Prosecutorv. Tadi, the trial chamber had to decide whether, after the
formal withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FRY nevertheless
maintained sufficient control over the VRS that the VRS was essentially a de facto
organ of the FRY.2 3 If so, this relationship would 'internationalize' the conflict for the
purposes of IHL, with the result that Tadi6 could be charged with 'grave breaches'
crimes against those detained within the camps.
In making its analysis, the trial chamber invoked Nicaragua.Although it acknowledged that the key issue before the ICJ in Nicaraguawas whether the accused state
could be held responsible for violations of IHL, it went on to justify its invocation of
Nicaraguaon the grounds that the ICJ also had to decide which part of IHL to apply
to the conflict.2 4 As applied to the case before it, the trial chamber understood that
for the 'grave breaches' regime to come into force, Nicaraguarequired the prosecution to prove that after the formal withdrawal of troops on i9 May 1992, the FRY
nevertheless maintained'effective control' over the specific operations of the newly
formed VRS.2 5
In applying the stringent 'effective control' test to the facts of the case, the trial
chamber concluded that the standard was not met and that therefore the 'grave
breaches' regime of the Geneva Conventions did not apply.2 6
In a strong dissenting opinion, Presiding Judge McDonald argued that the majority
had misinterpreted Nicaragua,and that the 'effective control' test is a subsidiary test
to be applied only when no 'agency' relationship has been found between the state
and the non-state actors in question.2 7 What Judge McDonald referred to as the
'agency test' the court in Nicaragua had explained as a relationship that is 'one

21.

22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.

The extent of control that the FRY maintained over the VRS also became a critical issue for the ICJ in Bosnia
v. Serbia as it tried to determine whether the acts of the VRS at Srebrenica could be attributed to the Serbian
state. See infra section 3.2.
See Tadittrial judgment, supranote 20, at para. 560.
Tadittrial judgment, supra note 20, para. 587.
Ibid., at para. 585. As subsequently observed by commentators, the part of the Nicaragua judgment that
determined that the rules of international armed conflict could be applied to US-Nicaragua relations was
not dependent on the outcome of any attribution test. See, e.g., Meron, supra note r 5, at 241.
88
Tadittrial judgment, supra note 20, at paras. 5 , 595.
Ibid., at para. 6o5.
Ibid., Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald Regarding the Applicability of Article 2 of the
Statute, para. 22 (hereinafter TaditMcDonald dissent).
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of dependence on the one side and control on the other'.2 8 in other words, if the
non-state actor or group does not have such a relationship of complete dependency
on the state to be considered its agent, only then should the question be asked as
to whether the state exercised such effective control over specific operations of
those groups that it might nevertheless be appropriate to hold the state accountable
for violations committed in those specific operations. More fundamentally, Judge
McDonald disagreed with the trial chamber majority that the Nicaraguacase was
even relevant in determining the nature of the conflict for the purposes of finding
individual criminal responsibility: 'The inapplicability of the Nicaraguastandard of
effective control is patent; it was neither designed for these factual circumstances
nor is it an appropriate consideration.'2 9
2.4. The ICTY Appeals Chamber's rejection of the ICJ's Nicaragua standard
In 1999 the ICTY Appeals Chamber entered the fray, creating an explicit conflict with
Nicaragua.30 The Appeals Chamber agreed with the trial chamber that Nicaraguawas
relevant to determining the nature of the armed conflict. Rejecting Judge McDonald's
dissenting argument that Nicaraguashould not be used to assess the nature of the
conflict, the Appeals Chamber explained,
What is at issue is... the conditions on which under international law an individual
may be held to act as a de facto organ of a State. Logically these conditions must be the
same both in the case: (i) where the court's task is to ascertain whether an act performed
by an individual may be attributed to a State, thereby generating the international
responsibility of that State; and (ii) where the court must instead determine whether
individuals are acting as defacto State officials, thereby rendering the conflict international and thus setting the necessary precondition for the 'grave breaches' regime to
apply'
The Appeals Chamber also disagreed with Judge McDonald's assertion that the
'effective control' test in Nicaraguawas a subsidiary test to what she had termed
the 'agency' test.32 However, it also disagreed with the trial chamber majority's
acceptance of Nicaragua's'effective control' test, and in an unexpected move it set
itself up in direct conflict with the ICJ, stating that 'the Appeals Chamber, with
respect, does not hold the Nicaragua [effective control] test to be persuasive'.33 Its
justification for this attack on the jurisprudence of the ICJ was that the 'effective
control' test did not comport either with the logic of the law of state responsibility, 34
or with judicial or state practice.35

28.

Nicaragua,supra note 6, at para.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

TadictMcDonald dissent, supranote 27, at para. 32.
TadicAppeal, supranote 8, at para.i 5.
Ibid., at para. 104 (emphasis omitted).
Ibid., at para. 112.
Ibid., at para. r r5.
Ibid., at paras. 116-12 3.
Ibid., at paras. 124-136. The Appeals Chamber's interpretation of some of the cases that it claims represent
'state practice' on the issue of state responsibility has been criticized. See M. Milanovit, 'State Responsibility
for Genocide,'(2006) 17 EJIL 553 at 586 (arguing that the cases relied onby the Appeals Chamber represent
issues of attribution for the purposes of outsourcing (Kenneth P. Yeager v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 1 7 Iran-US
Claims Tribunal Reports (1987)) and establishing territorial jurisdiction as a prerequisite to the obligations of

34.

35.

1o9.
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The Appeals Chamber held that international law proposes different tests of state
responsibility which are applied on the basis of the type of actor whose behaviour is
being assigned for attribution. The first test applies when the actor is an individual
or part of a group that is not militarily organized; in this case evidence of specific
instructions by the state must be proven, or the state must ratify the conduct.3 6
The second test applies when the actor is part of an organized paramilitary structure; in this case a lesser standard of 'overall control', which the Chamber explains
must 'comprise more than the mere provision of financial assistance or military
equipment or training', must be shown.37 The Chamber also makes a fairly cursory
reference to athird test that seems akin to a notion of apparent authority, whereby the
actions of individuals can be attributed to the state when those actions approximate
the behaviour of a person who is part of an organ of the state.38
The handling of Nicaraguain the Tadic appeal has been criticized, not only for
the substance of what the Appeals Chamber said about the 'effective control' test,39
but also for the fact that the Appeals Chamber even addressed the Nicaraguatest in
the first place. 40 It is not too difficult to see the intuition behind the ICTY's general
inclination to look for an attribution test in trying to determine whether an external
state exercises so much control over the actions of a group of non-state actors that the
conflict is substantively an international one. 4' Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber
violated the basic principle of judicial economy by offering a wholesale criticism of
the validity of the Nicaraguaattribution test for the purposes of state responsibility,
when the only issue it needed to decide in the case before it was whether the alleged
acts with which Tadid was charged took place within an international or an internal
armed conflict. It was therefore not surprising that when presented with a case that
required the application of this test of attribution, the ICJ would take the opportunity
to explicate its position on Nicaraguain the context of comments made by the ICTY
in the Tadicappeal.
2.5. The ICJ's response to the ICTY's attack on Nicaragua
Given the aggressive attack that the ICTY Appeals Chamber had launched on the
ICJ's Nicaraguaattribution test, the ICJ was fairly measured in its response to the
issue in Serbiav. Bosnia. Avoiding a tit-for-tat approach, the Court did not try to argue

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

41.

human rights treaties (Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), ECHR, Judgment of 8 December r996) (40/1993/435/514),
rather than the attribution of individual acts to the state).
TadictAppeal, supranote 8, at para. 137.
Ibid.
Ibid., at para. 141.
See Milanovit, supra note 35, at 58r.
See, e.g., M. C. Bassiouni, 'The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps
and Ambiguities,' (1998) 8 TransnationalLaw and Contemporary Problems r 99, at 2 26-7; Sassdli and Olson,
supra note ii, at 578; International Law Commission, 'Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Commission,'
(2001) A/ 5 6/ro at '06 (Commentary to Article 8 suggesting that the ICTY's competence is not on the issue of
the appropriate standard for state responsibility).
There is, however, a persuasive argument to be made that there was no need for a specific test on this issue
since the guidance provided by IHL and the principles of international law more generally are sufficient for
the task. See Meron, supranote 15, at 241.
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that the ICTY had been incorrect with respect to the issue that had been before it
namely how to determine the nature of the conflict. Specifically, the ICJ noted that
-

102

Insofar as the [ICTY's] 'overall control' test is employed to determine whether or not an
armed conflict is international.. .it may well be that the test is applicable and suitable;
the Court does not however think it appropriate to take a position on the point in the
present case. 42
This was wise, since just as state responsibility is not within the ICTY's area
of special expertise, neither is the characterization of the nature of a conflict for
the purpose of applying JHL to individual actors within the ICJ's area of specialty.
However in respect to the ICTY's further claim that the 'overall control' test should
also be applied to questions of state responsibility for the acts of non-state organs, the
Court was outright in its rejection of the Appeals Chamber's approach. 43 Directly
rebutting the TadicAppeal Chamber's argument that logic required a single test to
answer both the question of state responsibility and the question of the nature of an
armed conflict, the Court stated,
[T]he degree and nature of a State's involvement in an armed conflict on another
State's territory which is required for the conflict to be characterized as international,
can very well, and without logical inconsistency, differ from the degree and nature
of involvement required to give rise to that State's responsibility for a specific act
committed in the course of the conflict. 44
Accordingly, the final outcome of the interplay between the ICJ and ICTY on this
question of attribution suggests that the ICJ will continue to use its Nicaraguatest
in assessing questions of state responsibility that come before it, and that the ICTY
will continue to use its 'overall control' test in characterizing whether a conflict is
internal or international for the purposes of applying the 'grave breaches' regime of
IHL.
The ICJ's language of deference towards the ICTY with regard to the issues that
come before that Tribunal give the appearance of a court that is being guided by
principles of judicial restraint: the ICJ commented as much as was necessary for it
to adjudicate the case before it, while reserving judgment on the appropriateness
of the ICTY's approach to the questions it faces. However, the Court's approach
might also be understood as having been driven by purely pragmatic concerns. One
might observe the likely futility had the ICJ attempted to fight the ICTY's judgment
on the issue of how to assess the nature of the conflict, given that since the Tadic
appeal the ICTY has developed a solid body of jurisprudence that is grounded in the
'overall control' test for determining the nature of the conflict,4 5 and to which the
Pre-trial Chamber of the ICC has already referred approvingly.4 6 To the extent that

42.

43.
44.
45.

46.

Bosnia v. Serbia, supranote r, at para. 404.
Ibid.
Ibid., at para 405. Cf. TadicAppeal, supranote 8, at para. 104.
See, e.g., Prosecutorv. Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-9 5 -14/I-A,

24 March 2000, paras. 131-134;
Prosecutorv. CelebiciAppealsJudgement, Case No. IT-96-2 I-A, 20 February 2001, para. 26; Prosecutorv. Kordic
and Cerkez, Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-9 5 -14/2-A, 17 December 2004, paraS. 299-3 13.
See 'Decision sur la confirmation des charges', Pre-trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court, ICC01/04-0/oo6-803, 29 January 2007, paraS. 210-211.
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this more pragmatic view has any credence, it may just be the by-product of a current
legal order in which there have not yet been any formal or enforced guidelines to
govern the interrelationship between the ICJ and the ICTY. However, this possibility
notwithstanding, the lesson from Bosnia v. Serbia may well be that any attempt to
guide different international adjudicative bodies towards a principled system in
order to avoid the potential for fragmented jurisprudence between the international
bodies will need to be flexible enough to accommodate the concerns for consistency
within each of the international bodies.

3.

FACT FINDING

There were two heavily fact-dependent questions that the Court had to resolve in
the case before it. Did genocide take place in Bosnia and Herzegovina? And if so,
could Serbia be held responsible?
As a threshold issue, the Court first addressed Serbia's question of whether, as
a matter of law, it would be possible to find a state responsible for genocide in
the absence of an individual, over whom the state had control, having first been
held criminally liable for genocide by a duly constituted court.47 Answering in
the affirmative, the Court pointed out that the Statute of the ICJ authorized it to
undertake the task of deciding if genocide had been committed by a state, and that the
Genocide Convention gave it jurisdiction over this task.48 Furthermore, the Court
observed that any alternative answer would lead to an outcome whereby there might
be no legal recourse available to victims of genocide in a situation in which, due to
political constraints, the individual perpetrators had not been held accountable:'The
Court accordingly concludes that state responsibility can arise under the Convention
for genocide or complicity, without an individual being convicted of the crime or an
associated one.' 49 In our view, this is an entirely correct statement. However, as the
following elucidates, the Court's fact-finding approach in this test case raises doubts
as to whether, in practice, a state will ever be held responsible for genocide outside
the parameters of the prior convictions of individual perpetrators.
3.1. Was genocide committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
To answer this question the Court needed evidence of both the actus reus of genocide
(the acts set out in paragraphs (a) to (e) of Article II of the Genocide Convention, such
as killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and forcibly transferring children)
and the dolus specialis (that those acts were 'committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such' - as set out
in the chapeau of Article II of the Genocide Convention). In terms of the question
of whether genocide had been committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ICJ was
highly deferential to the findings of the ICTY, which has competence to decide both

47.
48.
49.

Bosnia v. Serbia, supranote r, at para. i8o.
Ibid., at para. '8'.
Ibid., at para. 182.
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these issues with respect to whether individual alleged perpetrators can be held
liable for genocide.
The Court was careful to lay out the different weights it proposed to give to
findings presented from different stages of the ICTY's process, from indictment
through to appeal, recognizing that because no definitive rulings are made before
the conclusion of a trial, it would not be appropriate for the Court to give weight to
evidence elicited from pre-trial stages because the standard of proof at those stages
is lower than the standard the Court was using in Bosnia v. Serbia.5o However, this
decision notwithstanding, the Court made a point of noting that while the inclusion
of charges in an indictment could not be accorded evidentiary weight, the Prosecutor's decision to 'not include or to exclude' a genocide charge from an indictment
might be 'significant'. 5' The Court did not, however, offer any explanation for why
this would be so.
Having laid out this framework, the Court then proceeded to consider the factual
evidence presented to it under the categories established by Article II of the Genocide
Convention. The subsequent 122 paragraphs of the judgment are largely devoted
to laying out the evidence presented by the parties, and in particular summarizing
the findings of the judgments of the ICTY. In the process, the Court found there
to be persuasive and conclusive evidence that the material elements (actus reus)
of genocide were committed with respect to Genocide Convention Article 11(a) 52
(killing members of a protected group), Article 11(b) 53 (causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the protected group), and Article II(c) 54 (deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life intended to bring about the destruction of
the group in whole or in part), but not with respect to Articles II(d)55 or II(e).s6
With regard to dolus specialis, however, the Court found that in all instances,
except for the massacres at Srebrenica, the specific intent element required to reach
a finding of genocide was not established.57 The Court's primary basis for finding
that the specific-intent element of genocide was established with respect to the
massacres at Srebrenica was the ICTY trial and appellate judgments in Prosecutorv.
Krstic.s8 In the Krstic judgments the ICTY Trial and Appeals Chambers found that
genocide had been committed in Srebrenica, and the Court concluded that it had 'no
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reason to disagree' with the ICTY's findings on this issue. 59 Accepting its reasoned
explanation for why it would give evidentiary significance to the judgments of the
ICTY,60 this part of the Court's judgment is unobjectionable. However the Court's
basis for finding that specific intent had not been established in other situations
in which the material element of genocide had been established was much less
convincing.
3.1.1. Drawing inferencesfrom the absence of ICTY convictions

With respect to the massive killings that the Court found had been committed in
areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina other than Srebrenica, the Court's justification for
finding that the specific-intent element had not been established was on the grounds
that it 'carefully examined the criminal proceedings of the ICTY and the findings
of its chambers... and observes that none of those convicted were found to have
acted with specific intent (dolus specialis)'.6' The Court applies the same justification
to its finding that the specific-intent element was not established with respect to
the material acts it found had been committed against the protected group under
Article 11(c) of the Genocide Convention in a number of detention camps across
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In explaining its inability to find specific intent, the Court
states that 'in none of the ICTY cases concerning the camps cited above has the
Tribunal found that the accused acted with such specific intent'. 62
The problem with the Court's reasoning is that the question before it at that
stage was whether genocide had occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not whether
genocide was committed by the relative handful of individuals who have to date
been prosecuted by the ICTY. The ICTY does not have the resources or the mandate
to investigate every possible charge of genocide arising out of the horrific crimes
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1991. Furthermore, the ICTY was never
judging whether genocide occurred at a given location or time, but rather whether
an individual before it was responsible for a particular act of genocide or not. It is
therefore inappropriate to draw inferences about whether genocide did or did not
take place based on what the ICTY chambers have not found to be substantiated
beyond a reasonable doubt, in respect of any given individual.
Further problematic is that the Court appears to give weight to the absence of a
conviction for genocide occurring in a place other than Srebrenica in instances in
which the accused died before or during proceedings (Miloievi6, Talik, Kovadevid
andDrljaa), 63 or in which a case with an indictment that includes a genocide charge
has not yet gone to trial (Karadzid and MladiQ). 64 In doing so, the Court implies that
had Miloievid, for example, survived trial and been convicted of the crimes for which
he was indicted, or had Karad2i6 and Mladid been arrested and brought to trial, then
59.
60.
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-

the Court might have reached a different outcome in the Bosnia v. Serbia case before
it. This line of reasoning is likely to be particularly frustrating for Bosnian victims
when in a different part of the judgment the Court holds Serbia responsible for
failing to arrest Mladid.65 While the availability of evidence will always have an
effect on the outcome of judicial proceedings, the availability or not of judgments
before one tribunal should not be determinative of the outcome of proceedings
before another independent body, especially if other sources of evidence or avenues
of inquiry remain open, and least of all on a matter of this gravity and importance.
The Court's deference to the ICTY's findings was sensible to the extent that it
would have been unnecessarily duplicative for the ICJ itself to determine those
facts which had already been authoritatively established by the ICTY, and especially
when there is general acceptance regarding the rigour of the ICTY's own fact-finding
process.66 However, the inferences it appeared to draw from the absence of findings
in circumstances where that absence may not be probative on the issue of whether
or not genocide had actually taken place (as opposed to the distinct issue of whether
the ICTY had proved that a particular accused before it had committed genocide)
show the dangers of an uncritical approach to the incorporation of actions and
findings of one adjudicative body by another.
-

io6

Drawing inferencesfrom the absence of ICTY charges
The Court reaches its conclusion that specific intent was lacking in all situations
other than Srebrenica not only by drawing negative inferences from the absence
of ICTY genocide convictions; it also gives weight to the absence of ICTY genocide
charges. In one of the most questionable portions of the judgment the Court applies
this belief in the significance of what is not in an indictment to refute Bosnia and
Herzegovina's proposition that the pattern of atrocities, committed across many
regions, demonstrated specific intent. In coming to the conclusion that specific
intent could not be inferred from the pattern of atrocities, the Court not only relies
on the ICTY findings, but also on 'actions of the Prosecutor [of the ICTY], including
decisions notto charge genocide offences in possiblyrelevant indictments, and to enter
into plea agreements . . by which the genocide-related charges were withdrawn'.67
Giving evidentiary weight to the Prosecutor's decision not to include a genocide
charge in any given indictment, or to negotiate a plea agreement that involves
withdrawing a genocide charge, is troublesome. First, the Prosecutor's decision not
to charge genocide in an indictment may have nothing at all to do with the absence
of evidence that genocide was committed in any particular situation. The evidence
might indeed be conclusive as to the actus reus but wanting with regard to the
criminal liability of the particular individual accused person or persons before the
Tribunal. Second, crucial evidence may have been obtained from a state intelligence
source under the provisions of Rule 7oB of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Reference to such evidence in an indictment would thus be precluded. And, with
3.1.2.
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regard to a plea agreement, the acceptance by the Prosecutor of a confession of guilt
to a less serious crime than genocide might well be driven by the advantages of
avoiding a lengthy trial or the unavailability of essential evidence. There might,
indeed, be other weaknesses in the prosecution case that are unrelated to whether
or not genocide was actually committed.
Can the genocide at Srebrenica be attributed to Serbia?
Having found that, with respect to the first question, the massacre at Srebrenica,
led by members of the VRS, was the only instance in which genocide took place in
Bosnia and Herzegovina,6 8 the Court then turned to the second question of whether
the Serbian state could be held responsible for that case of genocide. Because the
genocide at Srebrenica took place in July 1995, after the formal withdrawal of the
JNA troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 69 the critical issue before the Court was
whether the acts of the VRS at Srebrenica could be attributed to the Serbian state.
In this respect, the extent of control that the FRY had over the VRS became a critical
issue.
The question of whether the Serbian state can be held responsible for genocide at
Srebrenica is not an issue that the ICTY has the jurisdiction to answer, because its
Statute confines it to deciding issues of individual criminal responsibility. 70 Thus
while evidence obtained through the ICTY could go some way towards answering
the question of state responsibility, the Court was unable to rely directly on the
conclusions that the ICTY had drawn from the facts before it with regard to this
question. Instead, the Court applied its two-part Nicaraguastandard 7 ' and the ILC
Articles 4 and 8 on State Responsibility72 to evidence presented by the parties from
a range of sources.7 3
3.2.

3.2.1. Access to unredacteddocuments

The Court stated at the outset of its analysis that it is the applicant - in this case
Bosnia and Herzegovina - who has the burden of proof in establishing its case and
proving the facts it asserts. 74 Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted this as a general
proposition, but put forth the argument that the burden should be reversed on
the specific question of whether acts of genocide could be attributed to Serbia. Its
rationale for this request was that Serbia had refused to provide unredacted versions
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of documents from the FRY's Supreme Defence Council (FRY Council) meetings that
Bosnia and Herzegovina believed would be probative on the issue of state control
over the massacre at Srebrenica.7 5
The FRY Council consisted of the highest-ranking political and military officers of
the FRY and was the constitutionally highest authority over the military during the
events in question.76 In oral argument, counsel for Bosnia and Herzegovina argued
that the unredacted versions of the minutes of the FRY Council meetings could be
expected to show orders given by the FRY to armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and payment by the FRY to officers in the VRS 7 7 - both of which would have been
central to proving that the FRY exercised effective control over the actions of the
VRS at Srebrenica.
In what has since become one of the most controversial parts of the Court's
judgment7 8 the Court not only refused to request unredacted versions of the documents from Serbia (as the Court acknowledged it has the authority to do through its
proprio motu powers under Article 49 of the Statute of the ICJ and Article 62 of the
Rules of the Court); 79 it also refused to draw any inferences on account of Serbia's
failure to provide unredacted versions of those documents. 80
In attempting to justify its decision, the Court noted that Bosnia and Herzegovina
had'extensive documentation and other evidence available to it, especially from the
readily accessible ICTY records'.8 ' This is hardly persuasive, given that Bosnia and
Herzegovina's reason for requesting unredacted versions of these documents was
that it believed these documents would provide evidence on the issue of attribution
that was not clear from the documentation it already had available to it. The unredacted documents were not available to Bosnia and Herzegovina from the ICTY
because of a confidentiality order imposed by the Tribunal at Serbia's request.
Was the VRS a defacto organ of the FRY?
Having refused Bosnia and Herzegovina's request to demand unredacted versions
of the FRY Council documents from Serbia, the Court assessed the question of
attribution on the basis of the redacted versions of the FRY Council documents and
other evidence presented by the parties.
With regard to whether the actors involved in the genocide at Srebrenica were de
jure organs of the Serbian state, the Court looked to facts elicited through the ICTY
and to intercepted documents, presentedby Bosnia and Herzegovina, referring to the
paramilitary group, the Scorpions, as a'unit of the Minister of the Interior of Serbia'
and as 'the MUP of Serbia'. 82 In what could only be called a cursory consideration
of the evidence on this point, the Court concluded that there was not sufficient
3.2.2.
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evidence that either the VRS or Republika Srpska satisfied the standard of being
completely dependent on the FRY,?3 or that the Scorpions were acting in complete
dependence on the FRY.8 4
In another telling example of the Court's dependence on the ICTY for fact finding,
the Court noted that the Stanific and Simatovic case pending before the ICTY might
provide evidence of a relationship of complete dependence between the Scorpions
and the Serbian state. However, it went on to say that 'the Court cannot draw further
conclusions as this case remains at the indictment stage'.8 s Thus the question lingers
as to whether a more expeditious trial in the ICTY's Stanificand Simatoviccase could
have provided evidence for the ICJ that the Scorpions were completely dependant
on the FRY, thereby generating a potentially different outcome in the Bosnia v. Serbia
case. Furthermore, if a relationship of complete dependence between the Scorpions
and the FRY does come out subsequently in the Stanific'andSimatoviccase, then the
finality of the ICJ's finding on this issue may be questioned.
3.2-3. Did the FRY have effective control over the VRS?

Having found that the test of complete dependence was not met, the Court moved
to the next test of whether the FRY nevertheless had 'effective control' over specific
operations carried out by the actors involved in the Srebrenica massacre. The Court
referenced reports by the Secretary-General of the United Nations," the Netherlands
Institute for War Documentation,8 7 and the US Central Intelligence Agency.88 Again,
the Court concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that Serbia had
effective control over the acts constituting genocide at Srebrenica, observing that
The applicant has not proved that instructions were issued by Federal authorities,
or by any other organ of the FRY, to commit such massacres, still less that any such
instructions were given with the specific intent characterizing the crime of genocide,
which would have to be present in order for the Respondent to be held responsible on
this basis.'

The Court denied that Serbia had effective control over the actors at Srebrenica
because of the absence of evidence of instructions from the FRY to commit the
massacre. However, it is exactly such instructions that Bosnia and Herzegovina
claimed were likely to be found in the unredacted versions of the FRY Council
documents.
3.2.4. The ICJ's inadequateresponse to the issue of unredacteddocuments
Given that the Court found insufficient evidence to attribute the genocide at Srebrenica to Serbia, the Court's failure to request unredacted versions of documents that
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may have been probative on the issue is likely to damage the legitimacy of the Court's
judgment in the eyes of many. Of course, only Serbia, the judges of the ICTY trial
chamber, and some members of the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor know how probative the unredacted versions of the Supreme Defence Council documents actually
are. However, it is not an unreasonable assumption that Serbia's argument that it
cannot provide unredacted versions on the grounds of its national security interests,
some 15 years after the period in question, is but a veil to keep hidden evidence of
a more explicit link between the FRY and the acts taken by the VRS at Srebrenica. 90
The unredacted documents may have also provided evidence of the specific-intent
element that the ICJ failed to find regarding the commission of genocide in other
areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 9
What is particularly frustrating is that this is an issue that the Court could so
easily have avoided. Not only did it have the authority to request the documents,
but, if Serbia had refused its request, it also had the authority to draw a negative
inference from Serbia's refusal. As Vice-President Al-Khasawneh points out in his
dissent, the Court itself has previously explained that there is an inherent inequity
in asking a victim state to provide evidence of the accused state's direct control when
the accused state retains control over the proof that would establish such control. 92
Accordingly, the Court in Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania)9 3 explained that
the victim state 'should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and
circumstantial evidence'. 94 However, the Court took neither of the options readily
available to it.
Even if, in actuality, the unredacted versions of the documents would not have
provided the explicit link between the FRY and genocide at Srebrenica that the Court
needed to hold the Serbian state responsible, the perception of unfairness generated
by the Court's refusal even to ask for the documents is a sad legacy to leave following
14 years of litigation on this case. At its best, an international judicial process - like
any form of adjudication that is perceived to be legitimate - has the potential to
lay contested issues to rest, thereby allowing those affected to move into a phase
of healing and a more stable form of coexistence, if not complete reconciliation. By
refusing, without any plausible justification, to request unredacted versions of the
documents, the Court undermined its potential to play this much needed role in the
region.
'
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4. CONCLUSION
In Bosnia v. Serbia, the UN's principal adjudicative body held that, as a matter of
law, it can find a state responsible for the commission of genocide. As the first
case to be adjudicated by the ICJ on this question in the almost sixty years since
the Genocide Convention was adopted, this alone makes for a historic moment in
international law. However, the ICJ's approach to dealing with legal and factual
issues that overlapped with the work of the ICTY will also become a focal point for
those interested in the development of international law in the coming years.
The ICJ's approach in Bosnia v. Serbiato the challenge the ICTY raised against the
Nicaraguastandard for assessing state responsibility can be viewed as being guided
by principles of judicial restraint; the ICJ commented as much as was necessary for it
to adjudicate the case before it, while reserving judgment on the appropriateness of
the ICTY's approach to the questions it faces. However, the Court's approach might
also be understood as having been driven by purely pragmatic concerns that steered
the Court away from upsetting already decided cases before the ICTY.
Those who are interested in establishing a framework through which to mitigate
the potential problems arising from the fragmentation of international law are
generally concerned with a lack of consistency between different internationalbodies.
However, to the extent that the ICJ's approach to the question of the appropriate legal
standard for assessing state responsibility in Bosnia v. Serbiawas driven by pragmatic
concerns, the case draws attention to the issue of jurisprudential consistency within
different adjudicative bodies. Any attemptto standardize inter-courtrelations should
be sufficiently flexible as to accommodate the - sometimes competing - need for
intra-court jurisprudential consistency.
While the issues arising from the failure of one international court to defer to the
previous judgments of another international court have been articulated at length
in the academic literature, 95 our critique of the fact-finding approach taken by the
ICJ in the Bosnia v. Serbia judgment suggests that scholars, judges, and litigants
should perhaps be equally concerned about the potential problems arising from
an inappropriate reliance on the findings of other courts. Furthermore, this is not a
concern unique to the ICJ. The Pre-trial Chamber of the ICC recently relied on the ICJ's
factual findings of the presence of Ugandan forces as an occupying power in Ituri96 in
order to decide that, contrary to the charges presented by the prosecution, the nature
of the conflict within which the alleged crimes took place was international, not
non-international. 97 As the case load of the ICC grows, one can predict the question
of the circumstances under which it is appropriate for one international body to
adopt the factual findings of another international body will become a significant
issue for those interested in international criminal cases.
However, it is in terms of the implications for future applicants trying to establish
state responsibility for genocide before the ICJ that the fact-finding approach taken
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by the Court in this case raises the most concerns. If one is to accept the Court's
position that it has the ability and jurisdiction to make a positive finding of state
responsibility for genocide, even in the absence of a genocide conviction for any
individual perpetrator,9 8 then the Court should not use the absence of a genocide
conviction to preclude it from finding that genocide was committed. 99 If its factfinding approach in Bosnia v. Serbia is to set any precedent for how the ICJ will
adjudicate future cases under the Genocide Convention, it is hard to see how the
Court will ever make a positive genocide determination in the absence of a criminal
court having already convicted individual perpetrators of genocide. On the basis
of this case, the Court's approach seems to be that if another judicial body with
jurisdiction over the events at issue has not already established genocide, the ICJ
will not either. If this is correct, then the Bosnia v. Serbiajudgment may have taken
away with one hand what it has offered with the other - promising an international
legal system that can hold states accountable for the commission of genocide, while
simultaneously ensuring that in practice that promise will only rarely be fulfilled.
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